Second, the applicant Lid argues that the scope of the negotiations authorized in the Asserbrief is narrow and that the so-called amendment goes beyond this narrow authorization. Lid argues that Assosent`s letter gave the COURT only the power to negotiate on its behalf “all employees who carry out electrical construction work in the area of local union jurisdiction over all current and future projects.” Therefore, Lid argues that the AEAB`s decision, which considers it a violation of alliance policy, cannot be upheld because it does not “derive its nature from the terms of the main agreement”. The central issue in this case appears to be the intent of Von Lid and the letters of approval attributed to the Court by the execution of this letter. But before considering the acquisition, it is necessary to address the first argument of the applicant Lid. The applicant argues that the scope of the letter is not the central issue, as the policy of alliance between Local 134 and the Court has not been “negotiated” and is therefore not part of a binding agreement. In response, the EJAB refers to the affidavit of Mark Nemshick, Executive Vice-President of the Court. Mr. Memshick unequivocally notes that the ECA and Local 134 have successfully negotiated a new drug policy, the … . The policy of the alliance. (EJABs, Appendix 4). However, a review of this affidavit makes us believe that it was the AEAB that “negotiated” this modification of the employment contract, not the Court of Auditors or Local 134. In his affidavit, Mr.
Nemshick, Executive Director of the Court of Auditors, stated that he had been a member of the AEAB since 1985. The AEAB`s mission is to assess disputes arising from alleged violations of the main agreement. The AEAB is composed of five members appointed by the Court of Auditors and five members appointed by Local 134. He went on to consider that the AEAB unanimously approved on 12 January 1999 the introduction of a new mandatory drug testing programme. On 21 September 1999, AEAB decided to implement a mandatory drug testing programme as part of the main agreement, the communication agreement and the housing agreement. As a result, AEAB agreed that the language of support for the mandatory drug testing program should be developed and included in the main agreement. Based on these facts, Mr. Nemshick goes on to state that “ECA and Local 134 have successfully negotiated a new drug abuse policy called the electric drug-free alliance policy. . .
. Despite this assertion, it is apparent from Mr. Nemshick`s description of the events in his affidavit that it was the AEAB`s membership that negotiated and adopted this change in the employment contract. As the AEAB is composed of five members appointed by the Court of Auditors and five members appointed by Local 134, the AEAB is an agreement negotiated by AEAB during its meetings, an agreement negotiated between the Court of Auditors and Local 134. But that is not necessarily the case. First, it does not appear that the ten members of the AEAB must be either members of the Court of Auditors or members of Local 134, but only that they are appointed by those bodies. Moreover, the role of AEAB, regardless of its member, is not to negotiate agreements, but rather to “resolve disputes arising from alleged violations of the main agreement”. Normally, amendments to the agreement that AEAB is to implement and implement are not expected to be removed from the AEAB. Nor would it normally be expected that the body responsible for assessing dysfunctions between different bodies would itself initiate such cases of maladministration to decide.